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Fishing Quota Markets AgEcon
Newell, Richard G.; Sanchirico, James N.; Kerr, Suzi.
Fisheries worldwide continue to suffer from the negative consequences of open access. In 1986, New Zealand responded by establishing an individual transferable quota (ITQ) system that by 1998 included 33 species and more than 150 markets for fishing quotas. We assess these markets in terms of trends in market activity, price dispersion, and the fundamentals determining quota prices. We find that market activity is sufficiently high to support a competitive market and that price dispersion has decreased over time. Using a 15-year panel dataset, we also find evidence of economically rational behavior through the relationship between quota lease and sale prices and fishing output and input prices, ecological variability, and market interest rates. Controlling...
Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper Palavras-chave: Tradable permits; Individual transferable quota; Fisheries; Policy; Resource /Energy Economics and Policy; Q22; Q28; D40; L10.
Ano: 2002 URL: http://purl.umn.edu/10451
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Individual transferable quotas and conservation: a critical assessment Ecology and Society
Acheson, James; University of Maine; acheson@maine.edu; Apollonio, Spencer; ; spencerapollonio@yahoo.com; Wilson, James; University of Maine; jwilson@maine.edu.
Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) have become a popular management tool for fisheries. They have been promoted in some quarters and seriously criticized in others because of their social and economic impacts. A more serious problem is that ITQs provide exclusive access to public resources presumably in return for some public benefit, namely conservation; however, in a high percentage of cases they do not conserve fish stocks. In this article, we focus on the reasons that ITQs do not conserve stocks. We point to a number of phenomena identified in the literature as affecting stocks of fish, including problems with total allowable catch (TAC), ecological hierarchy theory, r and K species, the Allee effect, scale and metapopulation structure, the need to...
Tipo: Peer-Reviewed Synthesis Palavras-chave: Fisheries management; Individual transferable quota; ITQs; Quota management.
Ano: 2015
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Using Private Rights to Manage Natural Resources: Is Stewardship Linked to Ownership? Ecology and Society
Gilmour, Patrick W; Department of Zoology, The University of Melbourne; gilmourp@unimelb.edu.au; Day, Robert W; Department of Zoology, The University of Melbourne; r.day@unimelb.edu.au; Dwyer, Peter D; Department of Resource Management and Geography, The University of Melbourne; pddwyer@unimelb.edu.au.
There is increasing interest in privatizing natural resource systems to promote sustainability and conservation goals. Though economic theory suggests owners of private property rights have an incentive to act as resource stewards, few studies have tested this empirically. This paper asks whether private rights-owners were more conservative with respect to their management opinions than nonrights-owners in five Australian abalone (Haliotis spp.) fisheries. Multiple regression analyses were used to link opinions to demographic, economic, and attitudinal variables. In contrast to standard economic assumptions, nonrights-owners suggested more conservative catch limits than did rights-owners, confirming qualitative observations of behavior in management...
Tipo: Peer-Reviewed Reports Palavras-chave: Australia; Comanagement; Fisheries; Individual transferable quota; Property rights; Stewardship; Sustainable behavior.
Ano: 2012
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